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Attacking The "Forfeiture As Liquidated Damages" Clause In
North Carolina Installment Land Sales Contracts As An Equitable
Mortgage, Penalty, And Unfair And Deceptive Trade Practice
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a recent revival in North Carolina of the use of a
low equity financing device. This device is the installment land sales
contract. It seems to have especially captivated the market in the past
several years in developing resort projects.1 These resort projects typi-
cally sell undeveloped lots to lower middle class families who plan to pay
for their lot during their working years and ultimately build the retire-
ment home of their dreams. Unfortunately, the present bad economic
times have introduced many of these purchasers (vendees) to a seem-
ingly fatal pitfall accompanying the use of the installment land sales
contract. This pitfall is the "forfeiture as liquidated damages clause". It
is a vendor's ax that strikes without prior notice in abruptly cutting off
all of the existing equity that vendees have sunk into their property. A
jortiori old methods of defense must be resurrected and novel methods
of attack must be advanced to protect especially the relatively low
income North Carolinians from the "forfeiture as liquidated damages
clause." This paper is devoted to illuminating some old defenses hiding
in the stacks and to proposing a novel attack based on these defenses.
II. THE*NATURE OF THE FINANCING DEVICE
Although most realty transactions in America today are still financed
by the traditional mortgages and deeds of trust, another method of
financing is becoming more prevalent.2 The device is the so-called
"installment land sales contract," alternatively called "land sales con-
tract", "agreement for deed" or "contract for deed".'Under this method of financing, the seller (vendor) retains his deed
as security for the purchaser's (vendee's) payment of the purchase
1. A conversation on November 26, 1975 with Mr. Donald A. Davis, former
Assistant. North Carolina Attorney General (Consumer Protection Division, 1971-1975)
revealed that on numerous occasions he handled complaints concerning resort develop-
ments. When the complaint indicated the method of financing, it generally was the
installment land sales contract.
2. Hines, Forfeiture of Installment Land Contracts, 12 KANSAS L. REV. 475, 476
(1964). ("The contract form of land sale finance was first utilized extensively by the
railroad companies during the latter half of the nineteenth century in selling the large
acreages acquired in the course of railroad building.")
3. Note, Installment Land Contract-Mortgage or Contract?, 26 U. MIAMI L. REv.
855 (1972).
1
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price.4 The purchase price is paid in regular periodic installments over
a term of years. These payments are analogous to payments of princi-
pal and interest in amortized mortgage payments which, depending on
the type of transaction, may approximate the rental value of the land.
The vendee is usually allowed to immediately go into possession under
an expressed covenant and has the right to remain in possession during
the payment period so long as he complies with certain other conditions
to which he covenants.5 Also, as required by covenant, the deed to the
land is delivered to the vendee when all of the payments are completed.'
This financing device presents several qualities which make it appeal-
ing to both the vendor and the vendee. The low income vendee is
especially attracted to the use of the installment land sales contract
because he oftentimes will not qualify for FHA or VA mortgage insur-
ance. 7 Neither would such a low equity purchaser be able to meet the
down payment requirement for uninsured mortgages in today's tight-
money private financial sector. For example, an uninsured prospective
purchaser can expect to make at least a 33% down payment (40-60% if
farmland is being purchased).8 However, with the installment land
sales contract, the down payment will generally be less than 20% of the
total purchase price.9 The closing costs (other than the down pay-
ment) will also be much less because there are fewer fees or none at all
necessary for title searches, title insurance, third party lenders, record-
ing, etc.' 0 Thus, the initial expense of moving in (closing costs includ-
ing down payment) will be a much lower cash figure than the tradition-
al mortgage (and deed of trust) financing device would be for the same
transaction.
The aforementioned advantages to the purchaser (vendee) are greatly
outweighed by the advantages that the installment land sales contract
gives to the vendor. At the outset the low initial moving in expense
enlarges his potential class of purchasers, thereby, arguably enabling the
vendor to receive a higher price." The vendor also avoids the paying of
4. Frequently the deed will be placed in escrow.
5. Typically, the vendee is responsible for all taxes, insurance and repairs, if
developed during the payment period. More critical covenants and conditions will be
discussed infra PENNY & BROUDE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND FINANCING, at 80
(1970) [hereinafter cited as PENNY and BROUDE].
6. In general the material in this paragraph comes from PENNY & BROUDE, supra
note 5, at 80.
7. Mixon, Installment Land Contracts: A Study of Low Income Transactions, 7
HousroN L. REv. 523-525 (1970).
8. Power, Land Contracts as Security Devices, 12 WAYNE L. REv. 391, 399 (1966).
9. Id. at 406.
10. Mixon found that in the Houston area closing costs for a house which sold for
$10,300.00 were $735.00 with a regular mortgage, and $86.16 with an installment land
sales contract. Mixon, supra note 7, at 535.
11. Hines, supra note 2, at 478.
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any discount points to any third-party lenders. 12 Moreover, there is a
significant income tax advantage to the vendor if he receives less than
30% of the property's value in the first year of transfer.'" Upon meet-
ing this condition and making the proper election for the Internal Reve-
nue Service, the seller will be taxed only on the installments that actually
are paid in each year and then, only to the extent that the portion of the
installment represents gain over the seller's cost basis. 4 Unlike the
mortgage transaction the seller will not be taxed on all the gain in the
year of transfer.
Probably the biggest advantage to the vendor is the benefit of the
notorious "forfeiture as liquidated damages clause." Through this
clause a vendor upon default by the vendee gives himself the right (or
depending on your viewpoint the vendee has given him the right) to
summarily (without notice) accelerate the contract, retake possession of
the property, and keep all installments paid and improvements made as
liquidated damages. 15 A typical clause used by a vendor corporation in
North Carolina reads:
That upon our default or breach of any term of this contract you
(or assigns) may, without any notice to us, notice being expressly
waived, either (1) elect to accelerate this contract and declare same
void and forfeited, together with a forfeiture of all payments and im-
provements, to be retained by you as liquidated damages and or for
rent for ,the detention of said Lots, and forthwith take immediate
possession of the Lots and remove us and anyone holding under us
in the manner provided by law for tenants unlawfully holding over,
or (2) elect to affirm and enforce this contract, accelerate the unpaid
balance, making same due and payable, at once, and enforce payment
of same.' 6
Because almost every such contract declares time to be of the essence,
default means falling behind on one payment, from the first to the last.'
7
Unlike the traditional mortgage approach, most courts have generally
not allowed a defaulting vendee to have a right to an equity of redemp-
tion. 8 As if the above windfall to the vendor were not in practice
12. Id.
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 453 (This condition would typically be met).
14. Id. See also, Hines, supia note 2, at 477 and Power, supra note 8, at 400.
15. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 20, at 29 (2nd ed. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as OSBORNE].
16. This clause was taken from an "Agreement for Deed" used to finance the
selling of real property in the Colington Harbor Development, Dare County, North
Carolina.
17. Note, Forfeiture and the Installment Land Contract, 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 83,
n.2 (1968).
18. For an excellent article see Lewis & Reeves, How the Doctrine of Equitable
Conversion Affects Land Sales Contract Forfeitures, 3 REAL ESTATE L.J. 245, 253
(1974) citing OSBORNE, supra note 15, § 20 at 29 and Lee, Remedies for Breach of the
Installment Land Contract, 19 MIAMI L. REV. 552 (1965).
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enough, one commentator asserts that the very motive for the use of the
installment land sales contracts is that vendors know that the people who
use this method of financing are financially incapable of asserting their
legal rights. 9 In such cases the defaulting vendee can be easily per-
suaded to leave, thereby making it easy to clear the title before resale."'
The vendor's advantage through the use of the "forfeiture as liquidat-
ed damages clause" discussed supra sets the stage for the crux of this
paper-how to attack this onerous provision under North Carolina law.
In order to understand the first method of attack, one must first observe
the analogy between a vendee in possession under an installment land
sales contract and a mortgagor under a purchase money mortgage.21
The main basis for this analogy is the doctrine of equitable conversion.
Under the doctrine of equitable conversion, a court of equity looks
upon a vendee in a land sales contract as the owner of the land even
though no title has passed.22 In turn the vendor is looked upon as the
owner of the purchase money.23 Another basis of analogy is that both
instruments serve to accomplish the same goal-a financing device. 4
In substance, the vendor is an equitable mortgagee and the vendee an
equitable mortgagor. Therefore, their concomitant rights and duties
should not differ because of a mere variation in form.25 Indeed, as
recently as 1967, the North Carolina Supreme Court, speaking through
Justice Sharp (now Chief Justice), stated:
The relation between vendor and vendee in an executory agreement
for the sale and purchase of land is substantially that subsisting be-
tween mortgagee and mortgagor, and is governed by the same general
rules.26 (emphasis added)
If the above statement could be taken at its face value, this may be a
solution for the protection of our defaulting vendee from the "forfeiture
as liquidated damages clause". If the same general rules govern the
vendor-vendee relationship as govern the mortgagor-mortgagee relation-
ship, why cannot the vendee invoke the same inviolable protection that
the courts of equity created long ago for a defaulting mortgagor? This,
of course, is the equity of redemption upon which a mortgagee (vendor)
must foreclose to extinguish. After all, the general rule is that
19. Warren, California Land Sales Contracts: A Time for Reform, 9 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 608, 633 (1962).
20. Id.
21. 5 WrLLISrON, CoNRACTs § 792 at 744 (Rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
WILLISTON].
22. THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 4447 (1963 repl.).
23. Id.
24. Lewis and Reeves, supra note 18, at 254.
25. Id.
26. Brannock v. Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 70, 155 S.E.2d 532, 539 (1967). (This case
will be discussed more fully infra).
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the courts will not honor an agreement to limit the right of a mortgagor
to exercise his right of redemption.2 7 For example, the longtime ac-
ceptance of this position by the North Carolina Supreme Court is shown
by the following statement:
If a transaction be a mortgage in substance, -the most solemn engage-
ment to the contrary, made at the time, cannot deprive the debtor
of his right -to redeem; such a case being, on ground of equity, an
exception to the maxim 'modus et conventio vincunt legem'. Nor
can a mortgagor, by any agreement at the 'time of the execution of
a mortgage, that the right to redeem shall be lost if the money be
not paid by a certain day, debar himself of such right; for in such a
contract, time will not be regarded as of its essence. 28
By the general rule, foreclosure is the only method by which the mortga-
gee may terminate the mortgagor's equity of redemption.29 Logically, it
would seem that the court's traditional protection against waiver by
agreement of a mortgagor's equity of redemption combined with the
recognition that the parties in any installment land sales contract have
an equitable mortgagor-mortgagee relationship would snuff the life out
of the typical "forfeiture as liquidated damages provision." For it is
patently obvious that such a clause is an attempt (generally successful)
to summarily cut off a defaulting vendee's (equitable mortgagor's)
equity of redemption. Surprisingly, the general rule in America is that
the defaulting vendee has no right to an equity of redemption. 0 Why
the inconsistency? One author suggests the reason is that most courts,
when initially confronted with the problem, simply failed to recognize
the analogy."' By the time it was in fact recognized, the doctrine of
stare decisis had made the error difficult to correct. Why did not the
courts initially recognize this analogy and strike down the "forfeiture as
liquidated damages clause" as an attempt to circumvent the right of re-
demption? The answer lies in the historical confusion by the courts of
the installment land sales contract with the "buy-sell agreement"-also
called "deposit receipt agreement", "purchase and sale agreement", or
"earnest-money agreement". 2
The fact that these two types of agreements are fundamentally differ-
ent has been recognized by two of America's greatest scholars in the
27. OSBORNE, supra.note 15 § 97 (1970).
28. Robinson v. Willoughby, 65 N.C. 520, 523 (1871).
29. WEBSTER, REAL ESTATE LAw IN NORTH CAROLINA § 248 (1971) (note, the right
to exercise one's right of redemption may be barred in certain cases of estoppel or
passage of time); OSBORNE, supra note 15, § 306.
30. Lewis & Reeves, supra note 18, at 253 citing OSBORNE, supra note 15, § 20, at
29. 5 WILLISTON § 792 at 776 (rev. ed. 1961).
31. Hines, supra note 2, at 480.
32. Id.
5
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field of contracts, Samuel Williston"" and Arthur L. Corbin. 4 Corbin
states that unlike the installment land sales contract, money deposited
under a "buy-sell agreement" would be genuinely forfeited as liquidated
damages upon default, ". . the actual injury being uncertain and
difficult to estimate and the amount not being unreasonable or dispro-
portionate to the total value involved." 5
What then are the distinguishing features between the "buy-sell
agreement" and the installment land sales contract that have confused so
many courts and attorneys? At this point some of the distinguishing
features, as written by one previously cited pair of authors, are worth
quoting. In a "buy-sell agreement" a prospective ".... purchaser makes
the deposit of the earnest money on the signing of the contract, with the
promise that in a relatively short time (weeks or months) the transac-
tion will be consumated, the balance of the purchase price paid, and the
deed delivered." 6
Under such agreements it is generally the expectations of the parties
that, upon the vendee's breach, the vendor should retain the earnest
money deposited as liquidated damages. It is also understood by the
parties that the earnest money is paid to evidence the purchaser's
sincerity and, in part, to compensate the vendor for removing the
property from the market for the period until closing, if the vendee
should breach the agreement. The earnest money deposited usually
does not exceed 10 percent of the purchase price. Such an amount
is sufficient, under most circumstances, to suggest a serious intent on
the part of the purchaser and to cover any brokerage commission that
may be involved should the sale not proceed to closing.A7
However, Williston suggests what is probably the most critical test for
distinguishing the installment land sales contract from the wholly execu-
tory "buy-sell agreement" for purposes of triggering equitable mortgage
treatment. That test is whether the purchaser is given immediate
possession and beneficial enjoyment of the land. 8
II. THE POSITION OF THE NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME
COURT FROM THE PAST TO THE PRESENT
Now that the incongruity and confusion in this area -of law has been
brought into focus, it is only fitting that the approach of the North
Carolina Supreme Court be fully analyzed. The analysis will be pre-
33. 5 WILLISTON, supra note 21, § 792.
34. Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to Restitution of Installments Paid,
40 YALE L.J. 1013, 1030 (1931).
35. Id. at 1031.
36. Lewis and Reeves, supra note 18, at 253.
37. Id.
38. 5 WILLISTON, supra note 21, § 792 at 774.
6
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sented chronologically in order to show not only where the North
Carolina Supreme Court stands on this issue, but also how it got there.
As early as the case of Poindexter v. McCannon, 9 decided in 1830,
the North Carolina Supreme Court showed its preference for a construc-
tion of any equivocal relationship between parties to a transaction for
the future conveyance of realty as that of mortgagor-mortgagee. Al-
though this case dealt with an alleged conditional sale rather than an
installment land sales contract, the language used by the court in
construing the agreement expressed the following rule of construction:
It is equivocal in itself. But it is sufficient to induce the Court to
decree a redemption, if nothing else appeared, because the Court
inclines to that side, to prevent oppression and hard dealing.40
(emphasis added)
In 1856 the North Carolina Supreme Court in Scarlett v. Hunter4 1
confronted a case that involved a suit brought by a vendee for the
specific performance of a contract to convey title to land upon one
payment on a specified date by the vendee of a sum certain with interest.
The vendee was allowed to go into immediate possession, but did not
make the payment on the specified date. Neither party took any action
for almost three years until the vendee tendered principal and interest.
Upon the vendor's refusal to accept the tendered principal, the vendee
brought the action for specific performance. Because this action was
for specific performance, this case is important for two reasons collateral
to its value as precedent. First, the court implicitly applies the doctrine
of equitable conversion by stating that:
Where there is a contract for the sale of land, -the vendee is considered,
in equity, as the owner, and the vendor retains the title as security
for the purchase-money. 42
Secondly, and more importantly, the court clearly applied mortgagor-
mortgagee law to the facts of the case in stating:
The right of redemption is not affected 'by failure to make payment;
for the mortgagee may rest satisfied with his security as long as he
chooses, and when he wants his money he may compel payment
within a reasonable time, or foreclose the equity of redemption.43
(dictum) (emphasis added)
The court through dictum seemed to recognize a defaulting vendee's
right to an equity of redemption in a land sales contract which must be
39. Poindexter v. McCannon, 16 N.C. 373 (1830).
40. Id. at 376.
41. Scarlett v. Hunter, 56 N.C. 84 (1856).
42. Id. at 85.
43. Id.
7
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foreclosed upon to be cut off if full payment was not made in a
reasonable time.
By 1864, the interest of a purchaser (vendee) in the land sale
contract had been further crystalized into an equity of redemption."
Subsequently, in 1879 the court in Jones v. Boyd45 again spoke, in
dictum, to the nature of the vendor-vendee relationship and to the
need to foreclose a vendee's equity of redemption. This case involved
an installment land sales contract payable in five annual installments.
Although the five-year period had not run, the vendor filed an action for,
inter alia, specific performance because the vendee had missed some
annual payments. The court disallowed the suit as being premature
under a construction of the plaintiff-vendor's title bond. (Evidently the
absence of a "time of the essence clause" prevented specific performance
until final default and the end of the five-year term). However, the
court spoke of the relationship upon final default as follows:
The relation between vendor and vendee in an executory agreement
for the sale and purchase of land is substantially that subsisting be-
tween mortgagee and mortgagor, and governed by the same general
rules. In both cases the legal title to the land is held as a security
for the debt, to be conveyed or reconveyed to the owner of the equi-
table title when the debt is paid. 'A vendor,' says Rodman, J., in
Ellis v. Hussey, 66 N.C. 501, 'who contracts to convey on payment
of the purchase-money, -may be considered as between the parties a
mortgagee.' Keeping the analogy in mind, it would seem that the
right of the legal owner to have possession and a foreclosure by sale
after final default must be the same in both cases.46 (emphasis added)
The now established dictum that a vendor would be entitled to have
possession and a foreclosure by sale upon default was reaffirmed in the
1908 case of Jones v. Jones,4 7 but again the court spoke through
dictum. In addition, the same dictum made it clear that the vendee
would be entitled to the surplus, if any, after payment of the balance of
the purchase money.4
However, in all of the cases heretofore examined, the notorious
"forfeiture as liquidated damages clause" was conspiciously absent from
the contract. Neither was there any "time of the essence" clause
reflected in any of these opinions. It remained to be seen what effect, if
any, their inclusion would have made in the dictum of the above cases
which seemingly established the vendee's entitlement to foreclosure on
his equity of redemption and to any surplus above that needed to satisfy
44. Schoffner v. Fogleman, 60 N.C. 564, 568 (1864).
45. Jones v. Boyd, 80 N.C. 258 (1879).
46. Id. at 261.
47. Jones v. Jones, 148 N.C. 358, 62 S.E. 417 (1908).
48. Id. at 360-61, 62 S.E. at 417-18.
8
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 2 [1976], Art. 11
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol7/iss2/11
378 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
the balance of the purchase price. In the very next term after Jones,
supra, the North Carolina Supreme Court squarely faced and decided
this question in Hicks v. King.49  In that case the plaintiff (vendor)
leased his farm to the defendant (vendee) for a term of ten years at an
annual rental of a certain amount of cotton with the additional provi-
sions:
... [T]hat if said rent was promptly paid, together with the taxes on
the land, then the defendant could become purchaser of the land
upon payment of fifty bales more, with provision for forfeiture if
any installment of rent is not promptly paid by lessee, and right of
re-entrance thereon.50 (emphasis added)
During the first five years the defendant (vendee) fell behind in his
payments and the vendor at the end of the fifth year brought an action
for recovery of the land and the balance due on the rent. The lower
court rendered judgment for the plaintiff (vendor) for the value of the
additional fifty bales of cotton and for rent due to date. Furthermore,
the court ordered that upon nonpayment the property be sold for pay-
ment thereof and costs. From this order the plaintiff (vendor) ap-
pealed. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the lower court
while rejecting the plaintiff's (vendor's) argument ". . .that the court
should have held that punctual payment of rent was of the essence of the
contract, and that upon default the plaintiff was entitled to re-enter and
take possession."51 The reason for the rejection of the vendor's conten-
tion was that the above quoted provision, for forfeiture upon default of
rent installments paid in, made the agreement in substance an equitable
mortgage, with all the accompanying protections. Concluding, the
court stated the guidelines for the case of a vendee's default as:
When, as here, the full period for installments has passed at the date
of the judgment, it is necessary only to deduct the payments made
and direct a sale of the property to pay the balance due. When there
are installments which have not fallen due, the present value only
of such should be charged against the purchaser. Contracts for sale
on installments are similar to mortgages. If neither is the equity de-
stroyed by the stipulation for prompt payment, but the debtor is
ENTITLED to have the balance ascertained and a sale ordered, and
to receive surplus, if any.52 (emphasis added)
The Hicks case was a culmination of the evolutionary process of the
law of installment land sales contracts in North Carolina. From it we
can extract the following principles:
49. Hicks v. King, 150 N.C. 370, 64 S.E. 125 (1909) [discussed briefly in 115
A.L.R. 380 (1938)].
50. Id. at 370, 64 S.E. at 126.
51. Id. at 371, 64 S.E. at 126.
52. Id. at 371-72, 64 S.E. at 126.
9
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(1) The vendor-vendee relationship is treated in equity as a mort-
gagor-mortgagee relationship;
(2) Parties cannot destroy a vendee's right to an equity of redemp-
.tion by a stipulation for time to be of the essence and default
to result in forfeiture of installments paid in as liquidated dam-
ages;
(3) A vendor is entitled to the balance owed under the contract
computed as follows:
(a) If the full term for payment of installments is passed at
the date of judgment by deducting the amount actually
paid from the total term price; or
(b) If the full term has not passed at time of judgment, by
deducting the then existing value of the payments which
should have been made from the total term price; (dic-
tum)
(4) The defaulting vendee is entitled to have a judicial foreclosure
and sale of the property;53
(5) The defaulting vendee is entitled to receive any surplus, if any,
from that sale, above the balance owed, based on the compu-
tation in (3) above (and presumably costs of sale).
From the date of this decision, 1909 until 1967, the North Carolina
Supreme Court seems not to have again considered directly or indirectly
the issue. Indeed, from 1925 until 1967, the court seems not to have
again addressed a case involving an installment land sales contract. This
may have been caused by many factors, but I suggest that the Hicks
decision stunted the growing use of the installment land sales contract as
a financing device. After all, if the court was going to treat it as a
purchase money mortgage, why should people not use the more tradi-
tional purchase money mortgage itself? But, with the passing of time
the holding of the Hicks case and the cases from which it evolved were
probably lost in the stacks and forgotten. Possibly this factor, combined
with a change in economic times, led to its return to use-the result be-
ing the 1967 case of Brannock v. Fletcher.5 4 This was an action by a
vendee to recover payments made under an installment land sales con-
tract.5 5 The contract contained an acceleration clause in case of de-
fault, but did not contain a "forfeiture as liquidated damaged
clause".5 6 The case arose over disagreements between the vendor
and vendee over collateral financial matters and alleged defaults in some
payments. As a result the vendor demanded that the vendee vacate.
The vendee reluctantly acquiesced and brought the suit to recover
53. For judicial foreclosure in North Carolina generally, see WEasTEa, supra note
29; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. 1-339.1 (Supp. 1975).
54. Brannock v. Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 155 S.E.2d 532 (1967).
55. Id. at 66, 155 S.E.2d at 536.
56. An examination of the Record on appeal shows this to be true.
10
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payments made. At trial the evidence concerning whether the vendee-
plaintiff was actually behind in payments was ambiguous. Neverthe-
less, the defendant-vendor was granted a motion for nonsuit at the
close of the plaintiff-vendee's evidence. 57 Justice Sharp (now Chief
Justice) initially stated that the plaintiff's theory of recovery was implicity
rescission, as evidenced by the defendant-vendor's allegedly wrong-
ful demand for possession, in which the plaintiff-vendee had ac-
quiesced.58 The result, if proven, the court reasoned, would be to
put the parties back in their original positions.59 The plaintiff would
be thereby entitled to recover installments paid in, minus any set-
off, for the rental value of the defendant-vendor's property during the
plaintiff-vendee's period of occupancy. 60 The court held that the lower
court erred in withdrawing the case from the jury because the ambiguity
in the evidence could enable the jury to find validity in the vendee's
rescission hypothesis.61
Apart from its value as a caveat to a vendee in pleading his theory of
recovery, the real purpose in the discussion of this case is to confront
dictum pronounced by Justice Sharp concerning the hypothetical
situation of the vendee being in default without the vendor having
rescinded the contract. At one point in the opinion Justice Sharp makes
the following statements with supporting authority:
If, however, plaintiffs were behind in their payments (as defendants
-allege), and continued in default after reasonable notice, defendants
would have been entitled to take possession of the premises without
resorting to an action of ejectment-provided possession could be
obtained peaceably. In such event, plaintiffs would not be entitled
to recover back what -they had paid.
'It is settled law that where a party agrees to purchase real estate
and pays a part of the consideration therefor and then refuses or be-
comes unable to comply with the terms of his contract, he is not en-
titled to recover the amount theretofore paid pursuant to its terms.
Rochlin v. P.S. West Construction Co., 234 N.C. 443, 67 S.E.2d
464; Improvement Co. v. Guthrie, 116 N.C. 381, 21 S.E. 952; 31
A.L.R.2d 118, Annotation, Vendee's Recovery of Purchase Money;
55 Am. Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, Section 535, page 927; 92
C.J.S., Vendor & Purchaser §554a page 566.' Scott v. Foppe 247
N.C. 67, 70, 100 S.E. 2d 238, 240.62
An examination of the Scott case, from which Justice Sharp quoted,
immediately shows the mistake in analysis to which so many courts
57. Brannock v. Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 70, 155 S.E.2d 532, 537 (1967).
58. Id. at 69, 75, 155 S.E.2d at 538, 542.
59. Id. at 75, 155 S.E.2d at 542.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 72-3, 155 S.E.2d at 540.
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(North Carolina being an exception until this point), in other jurisdic-
tions, have fallen victim. The Scott case involved a wholly executory
"buy-sell agreement" (as distinguished from an installment land sales
contract with the vendee in possession) under which the plaintiff had
never taken possession. As has been previously discussed, forfeiture of
small sums in "buy-sell agreements" has always been allowed to be
validly forfeited as liquidated damages.6 3 Similarly, all of the cases
cited within the Scott case do not support the Justice's dictum.64 Final-
ly, all of the other citations relied on by Justice Sharp were to secondary
authority whose position understandably recites the misguided and illog-
ical general rule to which most jurisdictions (e.g., North Carolina and
Florida 5 being exceptions) have historically adhered.66
Later in the opinion Justice Sharp, again in dictum, makes state-
ments concerning a vendor's remedies upon a vendee's default.
[H]e may bring an action for damages for the breach, or may sue
in equity for specific performance, or bring an action for the pur-
chase price remaining unpaid, or proceed to enforce his vendor's
lien for unpaid purchase money, or, if he has parted with possession
,of the land, he may sue to recover its possession, or retake possession
if the premises are vacant; he may retake possession and recover
damages for the breach, or he may bring a suit for foreclosure of
,the vendee's interest or to quiet title, or he may rescind the contract
in toto with the usual rights and duties attendant on such action, or
he may accept the noncompliance as a forfeiture of the contract, or
he may bring an ,action to rescind the contract or declare it at an end.
Further, he may remain inactive and retain -for his own use the
moneys paid by the purchaser, and he may retain or recover a de-
posit made by the purchaser on the purchase price. 92 C.J.S.,
Vendor& Purchaser §375 (1955).
See Credel v. Ayers, 126 N.C. 11, 35 S.E. 128, 48 L.R.A. 751;
Allen v. Taylor, supra; Mitchell v. Wood, supra ....
If the purchaser makes default in the stipulated payments, the ven-
dor may refuse to perform further on his part, or he may take pro-
ceedings to foreclose the vendee's rights under the contract, 'with-
out incurring liability at law to refund to the purchaser any part of
the purchase money theretofore paid where the vendor does not act
indicating recission of the contract.' (emphasis added) 55 Am. Jur.,
63. Corbin, supra note 34.
64. Rochlin v. P.S. West Const. Co., 234 N.C. 443, 67 S.E.2d 464 (1951) (as
Scott involves a deposit under a buy-sell agreement); Improvement Co. v. Guthrie, 116
N.C. 381, 21 S.E. 952 (1895) (Vendee brought the action on the recission theory
without asking for foreclosure and would not have been entitled anyway because the
vendor was also a vendee who did not himself have title).
65. H & L Land Co. v. Warner, 258 So.2d 293 (Fla. 2nd Dist., 1972) discussed in
Note, supra note 3.
66. Lewis & Reeves, supra note 18, and WILLISTON, supra note 21.
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Vendor & Purchaser §§535, 536 (1946). The mere fact that the
vendor resumes possession of the property does not entitle the pur-
chaser to recover payments made on the contract where it is not re-
cinded. 92 C.J.S., Vendor & Purchaser §554 (1965).67 (emphasis
added)
For the latter statement the dictum can again be disposed of by noting
that it is supported again by secondary authority repeating the admitted
general rule which North Carolina historically has not followed. With
respect to the former statement, once again, the court cites three North
Carolina cases which would not support a claim of forfeiture of the
vendee's payments as liquidated damages in an installment sales con-
tract.6 8 In fact, the case of Mitchell v. Wood"9 actually is in accord with
the Hicks rationale. In Mitchell the court stated that a vendor who
sued a vendee in default for rescission of the contract, writ of possession,
and for damages for withholding possession had asked for the wrong
remedy. 70 The court went on to say that the proper remedy was
foreclosure and proceeded accordingly by substituting this theory ex
mero motu.7 1 It ordered that the vendee either pay the balance immedi-
ately or the property would be sold by the sheriff with the excess, if any,
being paid over to the vendee. 72
How could the court be sidetracked into pronouncing dictum which
was not in accordance with the Hicks decision? This question is
probably best answered by noting the conspicuous absence of any
reference in Fletcher to the Hicks case or the line of cases from
which (with the exception of Jones v. Boyd73 -which was used for
collateral purposes) it evolved. The parties simply must not have
brought these cases to the court's attention. Neither party cited Hicks or
any of its predecessors in their briefs (this is probably because the basis
of the plaintiff's action was rescission). Thereupon, the court lapsed
into dictum supported by secondary authority and North Carolina cases
which were neither on point nor in harmony with the Hicks line of
cases.
67. Brannock v. Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 73-4, 155 S.E.2d 532, 541 (1967).
68. Credle v. Ayers, 126 N.C. 11, 35 S.E. 128 (1900) (there, the vendee could not
get foreclosure and application of the proceeds to the judgment for the fair rental value
of the property in which he was in wrongful possession because the vendor himself was a
mortgagor whose own equity had been foreclosed and extinguished at time of judgment.);
Allen v. Taylor, 96 N.C. 37, 1 S.E. 462 (1887). (That case held only that in the absence
of an agreement to the contrary can a vendor regain possession of land from a vendee
until the full purchase price is paid. There is some supporting dicta, but it would seem-
ingly be overruled by the Hicks case 22 years later.)
69. Mitchell v. Wood, 70 N.C. 297 (1874).
70. Id. at 299.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 300.
73. Jones v. Boyd, 80 N.C. 258 (1879).
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Because the statements were by way of dictum, the North Carolina
consumer who is in the status of a defaulting vendee gets a reprieve. As
a result, the Hicks case is the only viable precedent in North Carolina
defining the rights of a defaulting vendee under an installment land sales
contract containing a "forfeiture as liquidated damages clause", because
it is the only case where the North Carolina Supreme Court has spoken
to the issue other than through dictum. The Hicks case is therefore the
guiding star to any lower court (and hopefully any subsequent North
Carolina Supreme Court) action taken to attack the onerous "forfeiture
as liquidated damages clause" in installment land sales contracts.
IV. POTENTIAL SANCTIONS FOR USE OF THE "FORFEITURE
AS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES CLAUSE" IN INSTALLMENT
LAND SALES CONTRACTS
Now that the North Carolina position has been established, we can
turn to the potential sanctions for noncompliance with the precedent of
Hicks and for the use of the "forfeiture as liquidated damages clause"
in general. From the Hicks74 rationale springs alternative remedies.
First, there would be the right of the vendee for the protection of
his equity of redemption to institute judicial foreclosure. This would en-
title the foreclosing vendee to the surplus, if any, after the satisfaction
of the balance of the selling price plus costs. If the vendor had already
summarily conveyed the property to another, there would seemingly be a
cause of action for wrongful alienation of the vendee's equity of redemp-
tion.75 In the usual case the vendee also would be able to foreclose on
the property, even though it had been conveyed to the vendor's grantee.
The reason being is that in the usual case the installment land sales
contract would be for a term greater than three years. Presumably, the
contract would therefore have been registered for the vendee's protection
pursuant to North Carolina General Statute §47-18. This would give
constructive notice of the former vendee's interest so as to prevent the
vendor's subsequent grantee from attaining the status of a bona fide
purchaser.
A concomitant line of attack on the "forfeiture as liquidated damages
clause" would flow from the decision of Hicks v. King.76 This attack
would be that the clause would be void as a penalty. In Knutton v.
Cofield77 the supreme court stated its test for a liquidated damages
clause being void as a penalty. The test as stated is:
74. Hicks v. King, 150 N.C. 370, 64 S.E. 125 (1909).
75. Freeman v. Bell, 150 N.C. 146, 63 S.E. 682 (1907).
76. Hicks v. King, 150 N.C. 370, 64 S.E. 125 (1909).
77. Knutton v. Cofield, 273 N.C. 355, 160 S.E.2d 29 (1968).
383.
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[A] stipulated sum is for liquidated damages only (1) where the
damages which the parties might reasonably anticipate are difficult
to ascertain because of their indefiniteness or uncertainty and (2)
where -the amount stipulated is either a reasonable estimate of the
damages which would probably be caused by -a breach or is reasonably
proportionate to the damages which have actually been caused by the
breach. 78 (quotations omitted)
Certainly, the liquidated dam'ages clause in an installment land sales
contract cannot meet this test because the court itself has specified the
method for computation of damages. 79  By using the court's own
method of computation the amount of damages is always certain to be
capable of measure in any case of the vendee's default; hence, the first
part of the court's test for a valid liquidated damages provision can
never be satisfied. It is also doubtful that the second part of the test
could ever be satisfied once a vendee had paid a substantial sum of
money to a vendor.
The vendee's entitlement to foreclosure, wrongful alienation, and
penalty actions, however, are traditional remedies which do not provide
the necessary deterrent against today's highly commercialized vendor
using the "forfeiture as liquidated damages clause". A much better
vehicle for use by the defaulting vendee, who has been summarily
deprived of his payments through a "forfeiture as liquidated damages
clause", is to bring an action for treble damages under North Carolina
General Statute §75-16, prohibiting "unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices" under North Carolina General Statute § 75-1.1.
This statutory language was modeled after the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1973 ed.). 0 Consequently, a
recent North Carolina Supreme Court decision has stated that, while it is
for the judge to decide whether an act or practice falls within the
language of N.C.G.S. §75-1.1, guidance for the interpretation of the
statute may be obtained from references to the decisions on appeal from
the Federal Trade Commission."' This statement by the court makes a
brief examination of the federal decisions in order.
Congress, in enacting the Federal Trade Commission Act, left unde-
fined the exact prohibition of the statute in order to achieve flexibility:
What shall constitute unfair methods of competition denounced by
the act, is left without specific definition. Congress deemed it bet-
ter to leave the subject without precise definition, and to have each
78. Id. at 361, 160 S.E.2d at 34.
79. Hicks v. King, 150 N.C. 370, 64 S.E. 125 (1909).
80. Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975).
81. Id. at 308, 218 S.E.2d at 345.
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case determined upon its own facts, owing to multifarious means by
which it is sought to effectuate such schemes.82
Nevertheless, in the last 54 years since this decision, certain broad
principles have emerged. It can now be asserted that any device,
manner of operation, mode of doing business, or method of advertise-
ment, carried on in business or commerce which has the capacity or
likelihood to deceive the public constitutes an unfair and deceptive trade
practice. It is not essential that actual deception take place, it being suf-
ficient that there exists a capacity to deceive.8 3 Neither is it necessary
in order for an act to be held unfair and deceptive that it constitute
fraud.8 4 Whether good or bad faith exists, or whether the intent to de-
ceive exists, is not material to the question of whether the act is being
violated, since it is sufficient that the device, advertisement, trade
name, representation, or manner of doing business is likely to deceive.
Most importantly, in determining whether a statement or representation
is deceptive within the meaning of the act, the courts are concerned
with the impression it is likely to create upon prospective purchasers."
Applying these principles, announced in these federal cases, to the
use of a "forfeiture as liquidated damages clause" in North Carolina,
immediately leaves one with the feeling that North Carolina General
Statutes §75-1.1 has been violated. What could have more capacity
to deceive or be more unfair to a low equity vendee? As typically writ-
ten this clause is an attempt to contract away a defaulting vendee's right
to foreclosure, judicial sale, and surplus, if any-in short, his equity of
redemption. This is an attempt to deprive a citizen of North Carolina
of a right clearly given to him under the decision of Hicks v. King 6
which is incapable of being impaired through contract.8 7 It would be
interesting to know how many citizens believe in their minds that if
they signed an installment land sales contract the "forfeiture as liqui-
dated damages clause" would be conclusive. This not only has the
capacity to deceive, but it is actually deceptive and unfair.
The view of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is in accord. The
FTC believes that such clauses are unfair and deceptive even though
there has been no concomitant deprivation of a state right to foreclosure
based on principles of equitable mortgage. Recently, the Commission
has filed no less than three complaints charging inter alia, that the use of
82. FTC v. Beachnut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922).
83. Montgomery Ward v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960).
84. D.D.D. Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1942) cited in Hardy v. Toler,
288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975).
85. Kulwajtys v. FTC, 239 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1956).
86. Hicks v. King, 150 N.C. 370, 64 S.E. 125 (1909).
87. Robinson v. Willoughby, 65 N.C. 520 (1871).
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the "forfeiture as liquidated damages clause" is an "unfair act or prac-
tice".,s One such complaint reads in part:
The aforesaid contracts also provide that upon failure of the pur-
chaser to pay any installment due under the contract, the seller shall
be entitled to retain all sums previously paid thereunder by the pur-
chaser.
The use by respondents of the aforesaid provision is an unfair act
or practice because the sums retained by -the respondents are not
calculated to bear any relation to the actual damages, if any, sus-
tained by repondents by reason of the purchaser's default.89
The result of one of these complaints has been an agreement to a cease
and desist order. °
These FTC complaints and order and the foregoing established feder-
al court principles should be, in and of themselves, sufficient persuasive
authority to support a court finding that a "forfeiture as liquidated
damages clause" violates North Carolina General Statutes §75-1.1. How
could any other result be reached if one of the avowed purposes of the
statute is to be carried out by the courts? That purpose is ". . . to pro-
vide civil legal means to maintain ethical standards of dealings . . . be-
tween persons engaged in business and the consuming public within
this State."91
V. CONCLUSION
By now it should be obvious that approval of the "forfeiture as
liquidated damages clause" in installment land sales contracts is an
illogical anomaly in the law. Its use has been perpetuated over time by
confused courts failing to see the purchase money mortgage analogy
until stare decisis had already set in. Historically, the North Carolina
Supreme Court is one of the few that has not been deceived and has seen
the installment land sales contract for what it really is---an equitable
mortgage. Accordingly, the court has heretofore preserved a defaulting
vendee's sacred equity of redemption. Once again, it is time for the
courts of this State, armed with the holding in the Hicks case, to come to
the rescue because many of our citizens are being deprived of an his-
toric right that they do not even realize they have. If Hicks no longer
is adequate, an unfair and deceptive trade practice under G.S. 75-1.1
and G.S. 75-16 would be a most welcome and badly needed substitute.
R. JAMES LORE
88. In re GAC Corp., FTC Docket No. C-2523 (1974); In re Horizon Corp., FTC
Docket No. 9017 (1975); In re Amrep. Corp., FTC Docket No. 9018 (1975).
89. In re GAC Corp., FTC Docket No. C-2523 at 19 (1974).
90. In re GAC Corp., FTC Docket No. C-2523 (1974).
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (1975).
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